QUOTES ON NATIONAL DEFENSE FROM ADDRESS BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND
We read much in the press today about the "aftermath" of
the summit failure.

There is much talk about "picking up the

pieces" and preparing to undergo the renewed cold war.

There

is much speculation as to how the summit failure will affect our
foreign policy and as to the degree of reshuffling that will have
to be made in our defense forces.
All of this would seem to indicate that the events in Paris
would necessarily require a change in our plans, particularly in
the area of defense.

The reflection of this attitude causes me

much more concern than the "failure" of the summit itself, for
it indicates that there exists a general misunderstanding of the
nature of our struggle with Communism.
The forces of Communism are singlemindedly pursuing a course
of world conquest.

Their aim is the destruction of free societies,

and more particularly, the destruction of capitalistic countries.
This was no less their aim and intention in the period when they
were expounding great hopes for peace through the summit conference
than is their aim today, or was their aim during the days of the
Berlin blockade,

Although their methods may vary from time to

time, at all times and with any method or approach used, their
goal is victory over the free world,
If, therefore, our policies must now undergo modification,
based on the change in the Communist approach signified by their
rantings at the U-2 incident, then our policies were inadequate
in the first place.

We should and~ adopt policies that will

encompass any possible fluctuation in approach by the Communist
leaders.

Such a policy can be devised, for although we do not

know and cannot anticipate their every change in approach, we
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know their intention to overcome us, and we know their intention
has not and will not change.
A strong and superior defense, balanced in every respect, is
the principal weapon on which we must rely to deter armed attack
and avert the horrible consequences of a nuclear holocaust.

We

must not merely seek to attain peace; for peace can be had through
surrender.

What we must set as our goal is peace with freedom,

and this can only be achieved by surpassing the Soviets in every
vital area of competition--above all, in our defense and retaliatory
strength.
Any changes which now appear to be necessary in our defense
forces are changes that needed to be made regardless of summit
success or failure.

We cannot afford, either financially or

militarily, to fluctuate our military strength to respond to every
frown or smile of Mr. Khrushchev, or whoever might be the Russian
dictator at the time.

Our defense forces must be stronger--not

necessarily bigger, but stronger--than the Communist forces in
every respect.
ment.

If necessary, we must sacrifice for this accomplish

Our military force does not meet this test in every respect

at the present time.

In some areas we have a bare minimum, in

others less than the minimum requirements.

Our deficiencies are

due not to lack of ability, but to lack of concentration on winning
the struggle with Communism instead of merely hoping for peace.
There are several steps which are essential at this time to
strengthen our military power.

Priority cannot be given, for they

are inter-related, and all are necessary.
1.

These steps are as follows:

We must have a clear superiority in strategic nuclear

imapons rather than the mere edge we have at present. We cannot
afford to gamble with this vital area of our defense program.
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The

liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan missiles, both approaching operational
full
status, must be hastened into/operational status, and crews trained
to maintain and operate them.

The Minuteman missile, mobile because

it is solid-fueled, must be perfected at the earliest time possible.
The elusive and effective Folaris submarine missile must be produced
and launched at a faster rate.

While we strive to perfect these

new weapons, we must provide the funds to keep the Strategic Air
Force, whose potential was emphasized by the U-2 flights, on const~nt
alert.
2.

~ ~

design

!n!! equip

~

firepower 2f. tactical nuclear weapons.

ground forces with maximum
It is impractical to attempt

to match the Cornmunist ground forces man for man.

With a lesser

number of troops, we must have a potential superiority in firepower
e,nd modern eauiDment
/~hat can be tlti11zed in a given geographical area. Due to the total
risk involved, the Russians are more likely to cornmence a war of
aggression in a limited area than to commence an all-out nuclear
exchange.

Our strategic forces are no deterrent to a limited

conflict.

A deterrent depends on the enemy's belief that the

deterring force will be used, and even we have doubts that we would
resort to an all-out nuclear exchange over some of the possible
local outbreaks.

3.

We~ secure sufficient modern airlift capability to

rapidly transport these high-firepower ground troops i2_ any

2f. the world in which they~ needed.
equipped with obsolete aircraft.

rn

MATS is under strength and

At the present time, we don't have

the capability of lifting even one of the STRAC divisions to Europe
in two weeks.

It now appears likely that $250 million will be

appropriated this year for MATS modernization.
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This is the minimum

that is necessary.

Defense Department plans for MATS are inadequate

and must be expanded.
These steps did not become necessary because of the summit
failure.

They have been needed all along, and many of us have

fought to have them begun.

They are needed because of the nature

of our struggle with Communism, and without which victory may be
theirs and not ours.

-END-
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